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Resumen: Las elecciones generales de 1923 
representaron el canto de cisne de la política 
representativa en Madrid durante la etapa de la 
Restauración. La expresión del voto de la capital 
española ha sido generalmente analizada en este 
contexto como un veredicto sobre la cuestión de 
Marruecos y el asunto de las responsabilidades 
exigidas tras el desastre de Annual. Sin obviar este 
detalle y otros relacionados con la presentación de un 
programa más moderado por parte del PSOE, este 
artículo indaga en la influencia que el marco urbano y 
la actuación socialista en el mismo jugaron en el 
resultado de los comicios. El análisis de la acción 
política municipal socialista previa a las votaciones 
permitirá ahondar en esta cuestión y entender el 
escrutinio final, observado desde una perspectiva 
socio-espacial micro analítica.  
Palabras clave: Madrid, socialismo, política 
municipal, comportamientos electorales. 
Abstract: The general elections of 1923 represented 
the swan song of socialism in Madrid during the 
Restoration period. The tendencies of voting 
behaviour of the city in this context has been generally 
analysed as a verdict on the question of Morocco and 
the issue of responsibilities required after the Annual 
Disaster. Having in mind this detail and others related 
to the presentation of a moderate program by the 
PSOE, this article explores the influence that the urban 
framework and the socialist performances in it played 
in the outcome of the elections. The analysis of the 
socialist municipal political action prior to voting will 
allow us to delve into this question and understand the 
results, observed from a micro analytical socio-spatial 
perspective.  
 
 
Key words: Madrid, socialism, municipal policy, voting 
behavior. 
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INTRODUCTION* 
The legislative election held in Madrid on the 29th of April 1923 went down in history 
for two main reasons: First, the election marked the end of the Restoration period and 
certified the death of the Turno in the Spanish capital, whose discredit had worsened since 
the 1917 crisis and inexorably so after the Disaster of Annual in 19211; secondly, and more 
important for this case, that election was the corollary of the unstoppable advance of 
Socialism in Madrid since the beginning of the 20h century.  
During the Restoration, Madrid as a city did not favor the interests of the dynastic 
parties in the polls2. The establishment of universal male suffrage in 1890 led to an era of 
sporadic, albeit emphatic, successes by Republicanism. When it focused on the unity of 
actions in legislative elections (1893 and 1903), it raised doubts about the robustness of the 
Canovist political model in the capital city3. The crisis of Maura`s "long government" and the 
events of the Tragic Week fostered the coming together of Republicans and Socialists at the 
end of 19094 for purely pragmatic reasons, as stated by Gillespie5. Both parties run together 
                                                          
* Este artículo ha sido realizado en el marco del proyecto nacional I+D “La sociedad urbana en la España del 
primer tercio del siglo XX. Madrid y Bilbao, vanguardia de la modernidad, 1900-1936, en el marco del 
Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia del Ministerio de 
Economía y Competitividad (ref. HAR2015-65134-C2-1-P). Su autor ha contado con la ayuda proporcionada 
en el marco del Programa de Atracción de Talento de la Comunidad de Madrid, 2017, Modalidad 2 (Ficha 
2017-T2/HUM-5216). 
1 Pablo LA PORTE: El desastre de Annual. Frente al imperialismo europeo y los políticos españoles (1921-
1923), Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2007; Eduardo GONZÁLEZ CALLEJA, (coord.): Anatomía de una crisis. 
1917 y los españoles, Madrid, Alianza, 2017; Salvador FONTENLA: La guerra de Marruecos (1907-1927). 
Historia completa de una guerra olvidada, Madrid, Esfera de los Libros, 2017. 
2 Javier TUSELL: Sociología electoral de Madrid, 1903-1931, Madrid, Cuadernos para el Diálogo, 1969; 
Rogelio LÓPEZ, “Madrid”, José VARELA (dir.), El poder de la influencia. Geografía del caciquismo en España 
(1875-1923), Madrid, CEPC, 2001, pags 383-420. 
3 Amparo GARCÍA LÓPEZ: “Elecciones en Madrid en el cambio de siglo”, Arbor, no. 666, 2001, pags. 383-
410; Óscar ANCHORENA: “La sociedad civil democrática en acción: el republicanismo en el Madrid de la 
Restauración (1875-1923)”, Espacio, Tiempo y Forma. Serie V. Historia Contemporánea, no.28, 2016, pags 
73-94 and Santiago DE MIGUEL: “La Unión Republicana en el corazón de la monarquía. El triunfo electoral 
de 1903”, Historia Contemporánea, no. 53 (II), 2016, pags 553-590. 
4 Luis GÓMEZ LLORENTE: Aproximación a la historia del socialismo español (hasta 1921), Madrid, 
Cuadernos para el Diálogo, 1976, pags 126-129 and Antonio ROBLES: “La Conjunción Republicano-
Socialista: una síntesis de liberalismo y socialismo”, Ayer, no. 54, 2004, pags 97-127. 
5 Richard GILLESPIE: Historia del Partido Socialista Obrero Español, Madrid, Alianza, 1991, p. 35. 
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for the general elections held over the following decade and obtained important results in 
the ballot boxes such as in May 1910, March 1914 and June 1919. However, as time went 
by, the growing influence of the Socialists in the winning lists became more apparent. 
Although it is true that in 1910 Pablo Iglesias won the first seat for Madrid's socialist group, 
his name was the last on a list full of Republicans of all factions. Four years later he 
renewed his seat as the second name of the Republican-Socialist list, second to republican 
journalist Roberto Castrovido. However, in the general election of June 1919, those leading 
the joint list were Iglesias himself and Julián Besteiro6.  
The above data reflects a conflicting evolution of Republicanism and Socialism in 
Madrid. The parties' weights were turned over, as one of them kept obsolete strategies to 
capture and mobilize social support whilst the other adapted to the new times, adopting 
increasingly more advanced mechanisms in order to organize and configure its internal 
structures, those of its core elements and the degree of participation of voters, supporters 
and activists. An example of this is the general election of 1923. This is clear if we look at 
the characteristics of the campaign deployed by the Socialist party and the constant 
references made during that time to the need for individual propaganda (as well as the 
official one), to the coordinated scrutiny of election proceedings and to the permanent 
collaboration with members of the UGT workers’ communities. The republican parties, 
divided and with a weak proposal in 1923, fell behind.  
Spanish historiography on the election processes of this historical context has clearly 
reflected the above-mentioned process and the growing existing competitiveness in the 
ballot boxes of the largest urban centers, such as Madrid7. However, there have been few 
                                                          
6 The break-up of the alliance in: Manuel SUÁREZ, “La división del republicanismo histórico y la quiebra de la 
Conjunción republicano-socialista”, Santos JULIÁ (coord.), El Socialismo en España. Desde la fundación del 
PSOE hasta 1975, Madrid, Pablo Iglesias, 1986, pags 141-160. The socialist parliamentary rise in: Santos 
JULIÁ: Los socialistas en la política española, 1879-1982, Madrid, Taurus, 1996, pags 51ff. 
7 José María MARÍN, “La ley electoral de 1907: ¿descuaje o consolidación del caciquismo? Las elecciones en 
España durante la crisis de la Restauración”, Carlos MALAMUD (dir.), Partidos políticos y elecciones en 
América Latina y la Península Ibérica, Madrid, Instituto Universitario Ortega y Gasset, 1995; Salvador 
FORNER, Mariano GARCÍA, Rosa Ana GUTIÉRREZ y Rafael ZURITA, “Modernización social y 
comportamiento electoral urbano en España, 1910-1923”, Salvador FORNER (coord.), Democracia, 
elecciones y modernización en Europa. Siglos XIX y XX, Madrid, Cátedra, 1997, pags 241-293; José 
VARELA: El poder de la influencia. Geografía del caciquismo en España (1875-1923), Madrid, Marcial Pons, 
2001; Carlos DARDÉ: La aceptación del adversario. Política y políticos de la Restauración (1875-1902), 
Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2003; Carlos DARDÉ, “Elecciones y reclutamiento parlamentario en España”, 
Javier MORENO and Pedro TAVARES (eds.), De las urnas al hemiciclo. Elecciones y parlamentarismo en la 
Península Ibérica (1875-1926), Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2015, pags 17-44. 
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who have focused on the influence played by the local context in the campaigns and the 
results of the general election. The Spanish capital did not live with its back to the 
unsustainable national political reality and the Socialists understood this perfectly, 
establishing a trend that was perfected with the Republicans from the beginning of the 20th 
century and that manifested itself intently in other European countries8. Public opinion 
contributed to their triumph, as it found in the party's minimal manifesto its means of 
expression. It is a commonly known fact that the political significance of the April 1923 
election’s result in Madrid had a close relationship with a public judgement on the issue of 
civil and military responsibilities after the Annual battle, focused on radical solutions of 
accountability put forward by the Socialists. However, we must not forget the influence of 
municipal actions carried out by the party in the city in the years prior to the election, 
responding to what they understood as social and economic needs of the population9.  
For this reason, this paper looks into the fine-tuning of the socialist municipal politics 
in the years prior to the election, identifying motivations, incentives and spaces for local 
representation and management. Subsequently, we will look into the content of the election 
campaign related to the urban context. Finally, we will analyze the influence they possibly 
had in the final results, according to district, neighborhood and electoral section. Thus, the 
objective is to underline the importance of everything that happened in Madrid's urban 
context and that could affect the specific scenario of the election, especially at a time of 
social and economic conflict.  
To fulfil that objective, we will carry out a deep analysis of the electoral records of 
1923, focusing on any data that enables us to understand the degree of interaction of the 
Socialist party in terms of social bases. This analysis will be complemented with the 
documents coming from the Agrupación Socialista Madrileña (Socialist Group of Madrid) 
(ASM), stored by the Archive of the Pablo Iglesias Foundation, and with documents from the 
socialist press, key to understand the party's organization strategies during elections and to 
envisage the discourse characteristics of the national and local campaigns. Finally, the 
                                                          
8 Patrizia DOGLIANI : Un laboratorio di socialismo municipale. La Francia (1870-1920), Milán, Franco Angeli, 
1991; Uwe KÜHL : Der Munizipalsozialismus in Europa, München, R. Oldenburg Verlag, 2001 ; Aude 
CHAMOUARD : Une autre histoire du socialisme: les politiques à l’épreuve du terrain, 1919-1920, Paris, 
CNRS Éditions, 2013. 
9 Santiago DE MIGUEL, “La Modernización de la acción política municipal en el marco de la transformación 
urbana de Madrid (1890-1923), Luis Enrique OTERO and Rubén PALLOL (eds.), La sociedad urbana en 
España, 1900-1936. Redes impulsoras de la modernidad, Madrid, Catarata, 2017, pags 267-287. 
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minute books of the City Council of Madrid for the period 1920-1923 will allow us to know 
the content of the Socialists’ proposals and actions in the senior municipal offices.  
 
MADRID, A LABORATORY OF MUNICIPAL SOCIALISM. 1920-1923 
The three years that elapsed between 1920 and 1923 were key for the evolution of 
Madrid's Socialism. At the onset, discussions on the adherence to the Third International 
were a hot topic, with an initial favorable opinion by the ASM. When the latter chose its ninth 
executive body in March 1921, that favorable opinion was turned upside down. The third 
Extraordinary Congress in April 1921 certified the division within PSOE and marked the birth 
of the PCE10. That division even reached the offices of the city council of Madrid, that at the 
time had the presence of councilors Antonio López Baeza and Mariano García Cortés, 
annexed to the Third International’s manifesto. The split generated enormous tension in a 
council where the Socialists, despite the importance of the political event, showed never-
ending activity that sometimes recalled that of Pablo Iglesias, Rafael García Ormaechea 
and Francisco Largo Caballero after their victory in the municipal election of November 
190511. The Socialists had not had physical presence in the municipality between the 
elections of November 1917 and February 1920 due to sanctions on the members of the 
Strike Committee, chosen in the first of those elections. But when they were able to 
participate again, they carried out a municipal policy in line with the interests of a 
neighborhood involved in a process of great social and economic turmoil.12.  
Andrés Saborit and Julián Besteiro were the ones who better understood the 
appropriate meaning of municipality for Madrid's Socialism at the time. For the former, 
municipalities were, in essence, political schools and the engine for Socialists, and nothing 
                                                          
10 Please refer to the following on the split: Gerald H. MEAKER: The Revolutionary Left in Spain, 1914-1923, 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1974; Josep ALQUÉZAR and Ramón TERMES: Historia del socialismo 
español, vol. 2, 1909-1931, Barcelona, L’Avenç, 1989; Paul HEYWOOD: El marxismo y el fracaso del 
socialismo organizado en España, 1879-1936, Santander, Universidad de Cantabria, 1990, pags 105-143; 
Joan SERRALLONGA: Pablo Iglesias. Socialista, obrero y español, Barcelona, Edhasa, 2007, pags 727-741; 
Abdón MATEOS (ed.), Andrés Saborit. Pablo Iglesias y su tiempo. Apuntes históricos, Madrid, Pablo Iglesias, 
2009, pags 866-894. 
11 Rubén PALLOL, “Socialistas en el Madrid jornalero. La conquista electoral socialista en el Chamberí de 
1905”, Antonio RIVERA, José María ORTIZ and Javier UGARTE, (eds.): Movimientos sociales en la España 
Contemporánea, UPV-Instituto Historia Social Valentín de Foronda, 2008; Santiago DE MIGUEL: 
Republicanos y socialistas. El nacimiento de la acción política municipal en Madrid (1891-1909), Madrid, 
Catarata, 2017. 
12 Francisco SÁNCHEZ, La protesta de un pueblo: acción colectiva y organización obrera, Madrid 1901-1923, 
Madrid, Cinca, 2006. 
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related to them could be indifferent to a citizenship that required good infrastructures and 
services to defend their interests13. As it was mentioned later by Constantino Salinas when 
referring to some articles published by Saborit, denying the political nature of a council 
chosen by universal suffrage was a contradiction, as suffrage is the utmost expression of 
the will of the people14 Even if the city council was administrative and economic in its 
functions, it was political by essence and its representatives had to use their experience in 
the cities to adapt them to the needs of the new times. In turn, Besteiro believed that 
municipal Socialism had always been constructive and an engine of collective services that 
represented models of technical perfection and good administration. The city council that 
showed to be permeable to Socialist influence and was committed to the municipalisation of 
services was key to overcome the delay on social life evolution and the resistance found 
when transforming the institutional model of the Turno political organizations15.  
The new city Council of Madrid, where the Socialists had an active participation, was 
formed at the beginning of April 1920, after obtaining seven seats in the previous municipal 
election held in February, that had drawn a new division of political forces in the city 
between the Socialists and Maurists. From then on, the Socialists set up a plan to activate 
municipal politics that affected several fronts. One of the most important ones had to do with 
food supplies, which increasingly affected the working classes and the low-middle class, 
which did not see their salaries increase as much as the prices of basic need items. The 
Conquest of Bread was one of the main goals during those three years, asking for the 
municipality to take the responsibility of baking the bread and selling it and demanding 
stricter inspections on the use of flours, in order to prevent the frequent abuses committed 
by the sellers16.  
Manuel Cordero, deputy mayor for the district of Inclusa, was one of the most 
decisive figures in that front. He started as a baker in the bread bakery Viena when he 
arrived in Madrid in 1902 and became a member of the ASM in 1905. He became a 
counselor in the municipal election of 1920 aforementioned. Since he took position, he 
                                                          
13 Andrés SABORIT, “La intervención socialista en los Ayuntamientos”, El Socialista, 25 January, 1945.  
14 The text by Constantino Salinas, entitled “Consideraciones sobre el municipio español” and published in Le 
Socialiste in 1962, in: Enrique MORAL (ed.), Andrés Saborit Colomer. Recuerdos de un concejal socialista, 
Alcalá de Henares, Pablo Iglesias, 2017, pags 86-93. 
15 Julián BESTEIRO, “Socialismo municipal”, Tiempos Nuevos, no. 1, 20 April, 1934, p. 3. 
16 Francisco SÁNCHEZ: La protesta de un pueblo…, op. cit., pags 94-96. 
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saved over 108,000 pesetas fighting fraud in bread sales by constant inspections of bread 
weight and by imposing monetary sanctions, leading at the same time a campaign against 
milk adulteration for which he filed 656 complaints. Food stores and groceries did not avoid 
constant monitoring tasks either. There were 253 complaints made for adulteration and 
lower weight in some food products. Bars, taverns, coffee shops and fishmongers with 
dubious hygiene conditions did not go unscathed either.  In total, the money collected by 
Cordero from the fines since he took position amounted to 57,126.50 pesetas (financial 
years 1920/1921 and 1921/1922). That amount is very different to the mere 3,148.50 
pesetas collected in the previous period17. 
Madrid's Socialists also heavily criticized private companies that profited at the 
expense of the city council in terms of public transport. The trams' conflict was maybe the 
most important one in this field. Saborit censored the actions of Sociedad Madrileña de 
Tranvías which, with the invaluable support of capital coming from several private banking 
institutions (Banco de Bilbao, Banco Urquijo and Banco Español de Crédito), ended up 
dominating the city's whole tram network. The tensions in the municipality on the unification 
of tariffs and line reversion time frames with Sociedad Madrileña de Tranvías were constant. 
The Socialists always supported the municipalisation of the service to put an end to the 
financial excesses generated by the private operation and to support some working classes 
that could not afford the cost of a key urban transport mean to solve the problem of workers' 
housing18.  
The issue of the underground was of similar importance Since January 1922, the 
ASM criticized the discrepancy observed between the services of the recently created 
transport mean and its high prices19. On top of this, the company awarded the work, 
Compañía Metropolitano Alfonso XIII, rejected paying the taxes the Socialists wanted to 
impose from the city council. Led by Cordero and Saborit, the socialist councilors stressed 
the negative aspects of the project, such as the granting by the city council to the 
concessionaire of urban land for free for the creation of platforms and stations, and the 
abuses committed by the opening up of ditches, causing inconveniences for pedestrians 
                                                          
17 El Socialista, 19, 26 and 28 January, 1922. 
18 Nuria RODRÍGUEZ, La capital de un sueño. Madrid en el primer tercio del siglo XX, Madrid, CEPC, 2015, 
pags 128-129. 
19 “El Metropolitano o la tortuga subterránea”, El Socialista, 21 January, 1922. 
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and for the peace of the neighborhood. The Socialists did not deny the favorable aspects of 
this new transport mean, but they wanted the works to be done under municipal 
inspection20  
In terms of urban planning, the Socialists were aware that Madrid needed new plans 
to adapt to a growing population, and this required a well thought of extension plan that 
relieved the pressure on certain urban areas and led to a comfortable and hygienic 
settlement of the most disadvantaged social sectors due to the global post-war economic 
situation21. The Socialists requested in the municipal sessions in which they participated the 
provision of solutions to the serious problem of lack of housing that was hurting Madrid 
since 191522. In their opinion, what the city needed was not works for the purpose of 
increasing the decoration and urban beautification, that is why the opposed some of the 
projects planned at the time, such as the extension of Paseo de la Castellana or the 
creation of a newer and longer Gran Via that would connect the northern and southern 
areas of the old city and the Ensanche with the smart-looking avenue created by López 
Sallaberry and Andrés Octavio23.  
The Extra radio’s urban development project depended to a large extent on the 
possibility to fix the problems that affected housing for those inhabitants since the beginning 
of the 1920s24. It was a plan that would certainly bring with it the promotion of construction, 
housing price decreases and would alleviate the imposed unemployment in some sectors. 
Since 1911, there was an urban planning model approved by the city council for this space, 
designed by Pedro Núñez Granés. However, the municipality’s technicians busied 
themselves in unproductive discussions on its feasibility. Meanwhile, the living conditions in 
Extra radio worsened considerably. The growing lack of land for construction in Ensanche 
                                                          
20 Archive Villa de Madrid (AVM), Minute book of the City Council of Madrid (LAAM), municipal session held on 
the 10th of March, 1922. 
21 Antonio GÓMEZ: “La industria de la construcción residencial. Madrid 1820/1935”, Moneda y Crédito, no. 
177, 1986, pags 53-81. 
22 Mariano GARCÍA CORTÉS: Diversas medidas para paliar los efectos de las crisis de la vivienda y de 
trabajo en Madrid, Madrid, Imprenta Municipal, 1922; José BRAVO and Alberto LEÓN: Escasez, carestía e 
higiene de la vivienda en Madrid. Medios al alcance de los Ayuntamientos, Madrid, Imprenta Municipal, 1926. 
23 AVM, LAAM, municipal session held on the 27th January, 1922. 
24 Charlotte VÖRMS : Bâtisseurs de banlieue à Madrid. Le quartier de la Prosperidad (1860-1936), Paris, 
Creaphis Éditions, 2012. 
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and the high prices led to overcrowded precarious constructions in an area that went from 
Paseo de Ronda to the borders of the municipality, complicating increasingly more the 
execution of a rational urban plan. As Besteiro said, in the sixty years before Madrid's 
expansion, the city had been witness to "the impulse of a painful need, unlike a natural and 
healthy phenomenon of growth, rather the sad overflowing of misery”25. Madrid's Socialism 
was aware that the lack of housing in Interior and Ensanche was forcing the working 
classes and, later, the low-middle classes, to move to Extra radio26. 
However, there were many other important issues to address. It was essential to 
solve the maladministration observed in the organization of the staff of some services that 
depended on the municipality, to end the deficiencies of a Laboratorio Municipal de Higiene 
(Municipal Laboratory of Hygiene) whose tasks were crucial to guarantee decent food 
supplies to Madrid's citizens, to improve school facilities and those of the childcare 
institutes, basic to fight the high child mortality rates, and to grant housing to the poor and 
the homeless in new Disinfection Parks, adapted to the modern principles of social 
assistance of other large European cities.  
Madrid's Socialists were gradually getting closer to the real living conditions of the 
population, namely in working districts. They carried out real direct civil participation in the 
political process, giving priority to health reforms in certain urban areas and the overcoming 
of differences identified versus other areas in terms of sewage, paving and real estate 
market. Nevertheless, it is also true that contrary to what happened a few years earlier, the 
ASM of 1923 did no longer represent exclusively the interests of the working class, it was 
also closer to the urban middle classes, economically more affected during the First World 
War. In the election processes, they had started capturing an important group of citizens 
with greater social heterogeneity, profiting from the identity crisis of the Republicans and the 
loss of contact of the latter with the public opinion during the previous years. The election of 
1923 turned out to be a good example of this. 
 
 
                                                          
25 Julián BESTEIRO, “Mientras discuten los técnicos. El proyecto de urbanización del Extrarradio”, El 
Imparcial, 20 March, 1923. 
26 Julián BESTEIRO: Conferencia sobre el problema de la vivienda y la acción municipal, Madrid, Imprenta 
Municipal, 1920.  
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ALL MUST HAVE A VOTE. THE SOCIALIST ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN 1923 
Tusell defined the election campaign in 1923 as not very enthusiastic in general in 
Madrid. Although that statement is true for most candidacies, the same cannot be said for 
the socialist candidacy, both in terms of strength and coherence. At the end of March, the 
party's leaders had already started calling on members of all districts to correct the electoral 
roll27. It was a fundamental prior step to guarantee the truthfulness of the lists and to make 
sure the working classes had the highest possible representation in the figures of 
inhabitants with the right to vote in Madrid.  
All must have a vote. To that end worked the local socialist groups, so that workers 
could visit, when checking their right to vote, a large network of centers belonging to the 
party and to the Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT). The central commission of 
Agrupación Socialista and the existing party circles in Extra radio (Cuatro Caminos and 
Bellas Vistas), in the south of the city center and in the north too, worked till midnight with 
the clear aim of facilitating the participation of the highest possible number of residents who 
were part of the working class28. 
During the weeks before the vote, the editions of El Socialista were full of warnings of 
this type and established direct communication with their supporters. They stressed the 
importance of individual propaganda besides the public/official one developed by the ASM 
in its candidacy. Although it was fundamental to mobilize the working masses in assemblies 
and halls, in rallies and conferences, and to shake up public opinion with posters, manifests, 
and press articles, it was also key to carry out propaganda at the bases, which could reach 
the deepest levels of the working layers. That was known as the individual conquest of new 
consciences29.
                                                          
27 Archive of Agrupación Socialista Madrileña (AASM), call number 500-3, Minutes of the General Assembly of 
Agrupación Socialista Madrileña, 29 March, 1923. 
28 AASM, call number 501-4, Minutes of the meetings of the Committee of Agrupación Socialista Madrileña, 9 
and 16 January, 1923.  
29 “La propaganda”, El Socialista, 11 April, 1923; “Hombres de buena voluntad”, El Socialista, 20 April, 1923. 
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Figure 1. Example of individual propaganda in the general election of 1923 in Madrid 
 
Source: El Socialista, 12 April, 1923. 30 
In a context in which socialist supporters were no longer mere recipients of the 
party's general ideas, it was key to stimulate their activity to avoid an abstentions that grew 
unstoppably in Madrid. Throughout the campaign, the socialist community's efforts had to 
focus on overcoming political apathy. This was the most severe disease of the individual 
and collective spirit, alien to a socialism that was the militia of discipline, activity and vigor31. 
A moral problem was being defined in the heart of a society and its political behavior had to 
take a turn in this election to bring to light a participatory political culture and a mass of 
                                                          
30 “Voting citizen:  
Surely you have friends, colleagues, relatives, brothers or sons with political rights and with the possibility to 
vote. You have a clear political conscience and you must give real content to your vote. We do no doubt that 
on the 29th of April you will vote for the Socialist Party. But your friends, colleagues, relatives, brothers and 
sons may not have the same clear political conscience and may not know how to give a practical application to 
their vote. Perhaps, due to apathy, laziness or forgetfulness, they will not vote on Election Day, or if they do 
they will do so wrongly. It is necessary for you, on Election Day, you, the reader, not just to vote, but to make 
your friends, colleagues and relatives vote. Therefore, you must visit them in their homes previously, you must 
convince them about the necessity to vote and you must give them the Socialist candidacy, and on Election 
Day you must accompany them to the polling station if necessary. Thus, you will contribute very effectively, 
voting citizen, to the victory of the Socialist Party’s ideals.” 
31 “La apatía”, El Socialista, 13 April, 1923. 
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voters consciously committed.  For similar reasons, it also highlighted the need to reduce 
political indecision felt by a significant group of voters, who could tilt the scales in an 
election of that nature. Therefore, it was necessary for the vote to be meditated and not the 
product of chance32.  
Underneath all those considerations lay the aim to convert voting in an unavoidable 
duty for the working class, avoiding their tendency towards the Republicans and their 
omission or removal of names from the Socialist candidacy. Voting the latter fully was 
crucial to obtain the six seats, regardless of the fact that people from that social sector had 
little or no hope on the tasks that would be carried out by the future Parliament33. Moreover, 
it was necessary to avoid the combination of names from different political candidacies in a 
same ballot paper, thus not falling into sympathies that could be felt for a person alien to the 
party's mandate. What should prevail in the citizens' political conscience was discipline, not 
the particular interests or the spontaneous manifestations of a feeling34  
Figure 2. Socialist propaganda against election abstentionism 
 
Source: El Socialista, 26 April, 1923.35 
Inspectors played a key role in the previous tasks. The party organized a network of 
political figures of those characteristics to participate in all electoral sections of the districts 
and to guarantee honesty when exercising the right to vote. Several weeks before election 
day, the ASM started to call on supporters and activists who could participate in the polling 
stations, first choosing those who had already done so in previous occasions36. As for those 
who wanted to participate and did not have enough knowledge on the procedures of the 
                                                          
32 “Los indecisos”, El Socialista, 16 April, 1923. 
33 Luis GARCÍA PLAZA: “El votar es un deber”, El Socialista, 21 April, 1923. 
34 El Socialista, 28 April, 1923. 
35 “No citizen should go without voting next Sunday. Abstaining is desertion, and voting wrongly is treason. All 
those who are exploited and all those who wish for a regime of greater freedom and justice must vote for the 
Socialist Party. CITIZENS, TO THE BALLOT BOXES!” 
36 AASM, call number 501-4, Minutes of the meeting of the Committee of the ASM, 3 April, 1923. 
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election day, conferences were normally organized to disseminate the most relevant 
aspects of the Electoral Law of 1907. Moreover, the party's press bodies were in charge of 
disseminating all kinds of instructions for the fulfilment of their tasks in the days prior to 
election day. They referred to the meetings organized by the party and UGT for the 
collection of documentation that accredited them and to specific behaviors to be followed 
during the voting. They urged to keep all documentation dealt with in the section, to then 
take it to the party's central election office and to write down in the electoral roll the people 
who voted and those who did not, as well as not to sign blank documents or reports that 
could be falsified later. 
Figure 3. Warnings and instructions to socialist inspectors in the election of 1923 
 
Source: El Socialista, 26-28 April, 1923.37 
For election day, the ASM presented 560 inspectors distributed in the sections of the 
ten municipal districts, either by the candidates themselves or by the proxies of the latter, 
although unequally. Based on those figures, we can imagine the size of the social bases 
that Socialism had in the city. Centro and Buenavista districts were the ones with fewer 
inspectors in the polling stations, followed by Congreso, Hospicio and Palacio, areas where 
                                                          
37 “For your interest 
We recommend our fellow proxies and inspectors to study the Electoral Act. It is essential to properly survey 
all operations and to REJECT SIGNING ANYTHING BLANK. The victory or defeat of the socialist candidacy 
can be decided BY ONE SINGLE VOTE! Attention to the election fight, comrades!  
No socialist inspector must sign documents IN BLANK. Watch out for the thieves of blank or falsified reports! 
Remember the councilors’ election in which they tried to falsify documents against comrade Gómez Latorre. 
The election DOES NOT END until the polling station seals and stamps the very last envelope. Proxies and 
inspectors must be the last to leave the polling station and the first to arrive in the morning. Comrades, let’s 
not regret later what can be avoided in due time.” 
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the party's candidacy obtained a lower number of votes, thus observing a correlation that is 
also true when analyzing the districts with the highest numbers of inspectors.  
The social background of socialist inspectors followed the same pattern across the 
city. They came from sectors linked to qualified and non-qualified manual work. About 85% 
of them came from that category, with a great presence of typographers, printers and 
bookbinders from the industry of graphic arts, shoemakers from the shoe industry, builders, 
carpenters and cabinetmakers from the construction and wood industries and locksmiths 
from the metal industry. However, the most common professional status was day laborers  
 
Figure 4. Distribution of socialist inspectors in the districts of Madrid in the election of the 
29th of April of 1923 
 
Source: Archive of Villa de Madrid, Secretariat (AVM-S), electoral reports of the 29th of April 
1923, call numbers 22-251-1 to 22-254-2. 
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Table 1. Distribution of socialist inspectors in Madrid per professional categories 
Social and professional category No. % 
Liberal professionals and technicians 12 2.14% 
Administrative and management workers 1 0.18% 
Office workers and civil servants 25 4.46% 
Sales people 18 3.21% 
Service sector workers 14 2.50% 
Farmers and forestry sector workers 2 0.36% 
Production and transport workers 481 85.89% 
No profession mentioned 7 1.25% 
Total 560 100% 
Day labourers 278 49.64% 
Source: AVM-S, 22-251-1 to 22-254-2 
There were other decisive elements of the social bases of the Socialist party in 
Madrid that contributed to the task of disseminating information on the minimum Socialist 
manifesto regarding the election and the supervision of the election. Its leaders and the 
electoral commission informed of the rules to supporters and members: to double up the 
propaganda efforts by handing out candidacies and manifestos all over the city38. These 
processes had the participation of the Agrupación Socialista Femenina (Feminine Socialist 
Group) and the Juventudes Socialistas Madrileñas (Young Socialists of Madrid), which 
called on their members to participate in the party's common task and to attend the polling 
stations on election day39. Both bodies carried out tasks that supported the proxies and 
inspectors, although they also participated with innovative propaganda strategies, such as 
driving cars around the streets of Madrid lit up with slogans such as: "Leave Morocco", 
"Remember Annual" and "Vote for the Socialists"40.  
After looking into the election campaign carried out by the lower and intermediate 
levels of the party, let us focus now on its leaders. First of all, we must highlight the 
collaboration of the working societies of Casa del Pueblo (House of the People), part of 
UGT, which was more intense than in previous occasions. One of the main objectives of 
Madrid's Socialism was to mobilize workers to vote and to vote favorably for candidates that 
represented their interests. In this sense, the letter written by Iglesias two weeks before the 
                                                          
38 AASM, call number 501-4, Minutes of the meeting of the Committee of the ASM, 3 April, 1923. 
39 “Ante la lucha electoral. El Comité Nacional de Juventudes a sus secciones”, El Socialista, 14 April, 1923. 
References on Madrid in: El Socialista, 24-28 April, 1923. 
40 “Los automóviles luminosos. Un éxito de la campaña socialista”, El Socialista, 28 April, 1923. 
16 
SANTIAGO DE MIGUEL SALANOVA 
Madrid, Socialist city. The keys to PSOE'S success in the 1923 general election 
 
HISPANIA NOVA, 17 (2019), págs. 1 - 48 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.20318/hn.2019.4515  
election was significant. In it, he talked about the "damaging obstinacy" for the party 
generated by a large amount of city workers who were still in favor of abstentions41. 
However, the truth is that at the beginning there was a great interest amongst the working 
class for voting, organized through different strategies of moral and material support to the 
party and the candidacy, One of the most significant actions was their participation in the 
collective subscription organized by the ASM to raise funds to pay for election propaganda, 
key to overcome the party's lack of financial resources42.  
The memos sent by UGT to all its sections in general, and by Casa del Pueblo to the 
workers in Madrid particularly, set the beginning of several days in which the working 
societies organized rallies and election conferences, published manifests and programs 
addressed at their members. Some of the most important events were those called by 
Grupo Socialista de Obreros de las Artes Blancas (Socialist Group of bakery and patisserie 
workers) (20th of April), by the members of Ramo de la Construcción (Construction sector) 
(21st of April), by the workers of Grupo Socialista de las Artes Gráficas (Socialist Group of 
Graphic Arts) (24th of April) and by the Grupos Socialistas de la Edificación (Socialist Group 
of Construction) (26th of April). Those events, as well as having the participation of the 
candidates present in the lists for Madrid, aimed to prevent abstentions and the potential 
Republican votes that could persist amongst the members of the working class43.  
The integration process of the protagonists of Madrid`s labor market to the Socialist 
campaign also affected some liberal profession representatives and white-collar employees 
who were members. Amongst the former, the most important group was that of teachers, 
which highlighted the general guarantees that Socialism and its candidacy in particular 
represented for their social, cultural and economic interests44. They stressed what some of 
                                                          
41  Pablo IGLESIAS, “Obstinación dañosa”, El Socialista, 14 April. 1923. 
42 “Las próximas elecciones. Suscripción individual y colectiva para la propaganda”, El Socialista, 13 April, 
1923. 
43 This was decided in: ASSM, call number 501-4, Minutes of the meeting of the Committee of the ASM, 10 
April, 1923. In terms of press references on this issue, please refer to: “Circular de la Unión General. La clase 
obrera organizada debe votar los candidatos socialistas”, El Socialista, 19 April, 1923; “Ante las elecciones. 
La Casa del Pueblo a las sociedades obreras”, El Socialista, 21 April, 1923; “Ante las elecciones. El Grupo 
Socialista de Artes Gráficas, a sus compañeros de organización”, El Socialista, 24 April, 1923; “Ante las 
elecciones. La Sociedad “El Trabajo” de Obreros Albañiles, a todos sus asociados”, El Socialista, 24 April, 
1923; “A los ferroviarios”, El Socialista, 27 April, 1923.  
44 Basis of the socialist education programme: Alejandro TIANA: Maestros, misioneros y militantes. La 
educación de la clase obrera madrileña, 1898-1917, Madrid, C.I.D.E., 1992, pags 361-422 and Francisco DE 
LUIS: La cultura socialista en España, 1923-1930, Salamanca, Universidad de Salamanca, 1993.  
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the people included in the Socialist candidacy for Madrid meant for the evolution of state 
education locally. As a professor, Besteiro had presented in Parliament his position at the 
service of teachers and national schools. Fernando de los Ríos appeared as the great 
promoter in Spain of a unified school. In turn, Saborit was the councilor who had worked the 
most for the education of Madrilenians, promoting the construction of six school groups and 
embedding ethics in the operation of urban school colonies, entrusting the teachers of the 
National Schools with selecting their own candidates45. 
Regarding Madrid's shopkeepers and industrialists, their class representatives tried 
to disseminate the beneficial aspects of the socialist minority political actions developed in 
the city council, such as their request to avoid growing electricity prices, which went against 
the decision adopted by the Ministry of Labour. They looked for similar approaches with the 
city council’s employees. Saborit and Cordero, in collaboration with Grupo Socialista de 
Obreros y Empleados Municipales (Socialist Group of Municipal Workers and Employees), 
mentioned promises in terms of salary improvements and of devoting broader budget items 
for the development of their work46.  
The favorable aspects of socialist municipal politics played a crucial role in this 
campaign. The group's position was clear with the note sent to Madrilenians on the 20th of 
March. It listed the problems pending solution that existed in the city47. That note was the 
source of a rally held in Casa del Pueblo on the 27th of March, with the participation of 
Rafael Henche de la Plata - on the hygiene deficiencies in the baking industry and the 
frauds and adulterations committed -, Besteiro, who focused on the housing crisis, and 
Saborit and Cordero, who spoke about the negative consequences of including Antonio 
Sacristán, chairman of Círculo de la Unión Mercantil e Industrial (Circle of the Commercial 
and Industrial Union) to the monarchist candidacy for the interests of the inhabitants48. 
The hand played by the monarchists with Sacristan in this election was not innocent. 
In fact, he was the main opponent to the loan project designed during the mandate of the 
Count of Limpias in 1920 for urban improvements in Madrid, later fully defended by the 
                                                          
45 “Asociación General de Maestros. Por la victoria de la candidatura socialista”, El Socialista, 25 April, 1923. 
46 “Conferencia de Saborit. Presupuestos municipales”, El Socialista, 14 April, 1923 and “A los trabajadores 
municipales”, El Socialista, 28 April, 1923. 
47 “La Agrupación Socialista al pueblo madrileño”, El Socialista, 26 March, 1923. 
48 “Los socialistas madrileños ante los problemas actuales”, El Socialista, 28 March, 1923. 
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Socialists. When the first rumors on the application of a 10% surcharge on the industrial and 
commercial fees in order to obtain funds first appeared, Círculo de la Unión Mercantil 
started a strong opposition campaign led by Sacristán. From mid-March 1923, meetings had 
been held at that organization to decide on the convenience of commercial classes having 
their own political force for the election.49 During the assembly held on the 16th of March, it 
was decided to present Sacristán as the candidate, and days later it was agreed to close all 
shops coinciding with the municipal session that would decide on the issue of the tax 
increase50.  
Madrid's shopkeepers went to Plaza de la Villa, home of the council, in a procession 
led by Sacristán himself. When the plenary session started, the demonstrators entered the 
building and caused a huge stir51. The Socialists announced that they would vote in favour 
of the tax, as it was the basis for the reforms that Madrid needed, and they spoke of the 
shopkeepers as members of a class that was being manipulated for election purposes52. 
Moreover, they condemned the demonstrations and the permissiveness shown by the 
authorities towards the organizers, as it was unfair treatment when compared to the 
demonstrations normally organized by the working class53. 
The Socialists knew the dynastic front would use the issue of the tax and would 
criticize the municipal authorities as the main weapons of their campaign54. Therefore, one 
of the strategies they followed was to detail the most favorable aspects of the municipal 
action program developed till then and that could still be implemented in the future. The first 
thing that needed doing was to explain the progress that the works would entail for Madrid, 
financed by the loan and the tax. The funds arising from them would help reorganize a very 
deficient cleaning service, disinfection service and that of the Laboratorio Municipal, it would 
allow to carry out new work in the construction of the slaughterhouse and the cemetery in 
the East, the cleaning up of the subsoil and the execution of paving and urban works in the 
worst areas of the city (neighborhoods south of the city center and the most impoverished 
                                                          
49 ABC, 16 March, 1923. 
50 La Correspondencia de España, 17 March, 1923. 
51 Heraldo de Madrid, 26 March, 1923. 
52 AVM, LAAM, municipal session held on the 26th of March, 1922. 
53 El Socialista, 27 March, 1923. 
54 “La décima y las elecciones”, El Socialista, 7 April, 1923. 
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areas of Extra radio, such as Cuatro Caminos, Bellas Vistas, Guindalera, Prosperidad and 
San Isidro)55. 
At that time, Madrid's Socialism also understood as a pressing need the annexation 
of the city's bordering villages, key to improve their infrastructures and public services and 
correct their huge hygiene-sanitary conditions56. In turn, the urban development of Extra 
radio by executing the Núñez Granés plan still appeared in the horizon as the main way out 
given the lack of housing, and it was the way in which Madrid's municipality could meet the 
needs of a population that was getting closer to one million souls57.  
New proposals were also added to the council in order to solve some of the main 
urban problems. Saborit was one of the most active members, planning the improvement of 
tasks carried out until then by veterinarians of municipal sanitary inspections to avoid the 
introduction of adulterated milk, the execution of settlement works in the southern periphery 
neighborhoods, reforming some shelter houses and establishing new services, including a 
public market and gardens in the neighborhood of Puente de Segovia58. He was also 
committed with the execution of improvement works in the district of Universidad, especially 
in the neighborhoods Bellas Vistas and Vallehermoso: fixing the paving, placing pavements 
and installing a sewage system that would reduce the degree of deterioration of those 
areas, reforming schools in some of the most disadvantaged neighborhoods of Madrid and 
building underground lavatories59.  
At the same time, the Socialists continued to bring to public attention the scandals 
committed in the council. Cordero used the weeks leading up to the vote to intensify the 
inspection tasks on the sale of bread and to verify that they were still of lower weight than 
expected in a huge proportion of cases, with the acquiescence of the local authorities and 
dynastic councilors. The socialist candidate sent a letter to the Civil Governor for the 
                                                          
55 “Las obras que irán en el empréstito”, El Socialista, 12 April, 1923. 
56 “Mitin en el Puente de Vallecas”, El Socialista, 29 March, 1923. 
57 Julián BESTEIRO, “Mientras discuten los técnicos. El proyecto de urbanización del Extrarradio”, El 
Imparcial, 20 March, 1923; G. FERNÁNDEZ, “El problema de la urbanización del Extrarradio”, El Imparcial, 29 
March, 1923; Julián BESTEIRO, “La construcción y administración de las viviendas”, El Imparcial, 3 April, 
1923; “En el Ayuntamiento se ocuparán dentro de poco del problema de las viviendas”, La Voz, 11 April, 
1923; “La urbanización del extrarradio y el problema de la vivienda”, El Socialista, 16 April, 1923.  
58 “Tres proposiciones”, El Socialista, 2 April, 1923; “Proposiciones socialistas”, El Socialista, 10 April, 1923. 
59 “Grupo Escolar de las Peñuelas”, El Socialista, 13 April, 1923; “Mejoras en el distrito de la Universidad”, El 
Socialista, 17 April, 1923 and “Evacuatorios subterráneos”, El Socialista, 20 April, 1923. 
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province of Madrid giving full details of the bakeries that violated the rules established by 
the municipal regulations and giving information about the kilograms of bread that he had 
seized in just two days (1,520.50 in the whole of Madrid)60. The monarchist press believed 
that Cordero was increasing his efforts to inspect bread for election purposes61, but his 
objective was to impose fines on the shops that incurred in those fouls and replace the city 
council's employees and senior positions who turned a blind eye on those misconducts62. 
Something similar could be said about the cemeteries of Patriarcal and San Justo, also 
inspected by Cordero. The councilor brought to light their shameful state of deterioration, 
especially the former one, with collapsed walls and coffins on top of coffins. Putting an end 
to that horrendous scenario was key in order to improve the quality of life of the citizens of 
Vallehermoso and to achieve the natural expansion of the district of Universidad, blocked by 
that cemetery63. 
Finally, the election campaign was also the ideal context In order to focus on the 
complaints being made in the previous months regarding the economic abuses committed 
by the companies operating certain services in Madrid (electricity companies installing the 
meters and increasing the electricity price, the underground company in the execution of 
works and private undertakers, which led to many requests to municipalize those services) 
and the bad hygiene-health situation in some key institutions in order to improve the quality 
of life of the population (childcare and elderly care institutions, and other facilities linked to 
charity and social care)64. 
The dissemination of the most relevant characteristics of socialist municipal political 
actions in the campaign was done at the same time as highlighting the most important 
national objectives of the party. As well as ideas propaganda, there was the need to 
condemn the existing social and political regime, focusing on the events of the preceding 
years and the abominable response by the governments. First, the conflict that came up in 
Barcelona due to the social and economic transformation caused by the Great War, which 
                                                          
60 El Socialista, 3 April, 1923. 
61 El Sol y La Voz, 3 April, 1923. 
62 “Concupiscencia y confabulación. Las autoridades municipales de real orden acuerdan tolerar el robo en el 
peso del pan”, El Socialista, 3 April, 1923; “El escándalo de las gratificaciones”, El Socialista, 12 April, 1923.  
63 “Los escándalos de los cementerios de la Patriarcal y San Justo”, El Socialista, 10 April, 1923. 
64 AVM, LAAM, municipal session held on the 26th of April, 1922. 
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favored the appearance of an anarchist unionism, fought by the authorities with military 
repression65. Secondly, the dramatic economic situation of a country indebted since the end 
of the global conflict. And finally, the fault of the government and the high military ranks in 
the disasters of Annual, Nador and Monte Arruit66.  
In the rallies and conferences held during the election campaign, the socialist 
candidates studied in depth the responsibilities for the Battle of Annual. The main starting 
points were the conference given by Indalecio Prieto at  Ateneo de Madrid on the 7th of 
April, and the opening socialist assertion rally on the 14th of April in Casa del Pueblo67. 
PSOE’s criteria in this sense was based on the main items mentioned previously by their 
parliamentary minority: distancing from the army Division General Dámaso Berenguer, 
Brigade General Felipe Navarro and the Colonels of the platoons posted to the General 
Command of Melilla who were present in the region when the withdrawal in Annual started; 
accountability of the governments of Manuel Allendesalazar and Antonio Maura; prohibition 
for the Army’s Court of Honor to decide by itself the penalties for the facts that led to the 
crime: the immediate closing of the country's military academies; dissolution of the Military 
Intendancy body and repealing the Law of Jurisdiction68. The socialist candidacy presented 
as its main campaign thesis abandoning the Moroccan effort with the demand to correct the 
military policies followed until then, focusing their programme on demanding accountability 
to the highest levels as it was the only possible guarantee to start a satisfactory change in 
the government procedures69.  
Finally, the socialist election campaign stood out because of the harsh attacks 
orchestrated against the Maurists and the Republicans. When punishing the former, they 
                                                          
65  Albert BALCELLS: El pistolerisme. Barcelona (1917-1923), Barcelona, Pórtic, 2009. 
66 These general objectives can be found in: AASM, 507-10, Manifiest of Agrupación Socialista Madrileña 
regarding the 1st of May, 1923. As for the historiographic treatment of those issues (including the socialist 
position), please refer to: Antonio MORENO: “El Socialista y el desastre de Annual: opinión y actitud socialista 
ante la derrota”, Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea, vol. 12, 1990, pages 103-132; Rosa María 
MADARIAGA: España y el Rif. Crónica de una historia casi olvidada, Melilla, UNED, 1998; Juan PANDO: 
Historia secreta de Annual, Madrid, Temas de Hoy, 1999; Patricio de BLAS and Eva de BLAS: Nadar contra 
corriente. Julián Besteiro, Madrid, Algaba, 2003, pags 192-201. 
67 El Socialista, 10 and 16 April, 1922. The impact of the figure of Prieto denouncing the military campaign in 
Morocco in: Indalecio PRIETO: El desastre de Melilla: dictamen de la minoría socialista. Discurso de Indalecio 
Prieto pronunciado en el Congreso de los Diputados los días 21 y 22 de noviembre de 1922, Madrid, 
Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1922. 
68 “La acusación socialista en el Parlamento”, El Socialista, 26 April, 1923. 
69 “Los candidatos a la opinión”, El Socialista, 26 April, 1923. 
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once again made comments about episodes that had worked as election gains in other 
occasions, either the executions in Montjuich after the Tragic Week, Maura's responsibility 
for starting the military campaign in Morocco, and the measures developed by him during 
his long mandate in order to repress the ASM's protests. They did not leave out the fascist 
trends seen at the core of the movement70, which could no longer be considered the 
champion of achieving the melting of the regime and the revolution from the top (concepts 
that had been included in their doctrines since the end of 1913)71, and the strategies 
practiced during the campaign through bribes and vote-buying in the outskirts' 
neighborhoods72. 
Regarding the Republican candidacy, socialist condemnation was based on Lerroux' 
potential desire to obtain certain government economic support in order to set up a minority 
in the opposition73. The ASM benefited from the malaise generated by the candidacy of 
Lerroux amongst the federal candidates, who decided to call an assembly to present the 
strategies to follow for the election74. Practically reduced to a minimum political expression 
in Madrid, the alternatives discussed where either presenting their own candidacy, or 
withdrawing. The federal assembly held on the 20th of April helped to totally reject the list 
established by Lerroux' stamp, and gave total freedom to the party members to vote for 
other similar parties, specifying that this could not be done with the official Republican 
candidacy nor with the monarchist one. In this manner, the federalists implicitly gave their 
support to the socialist list for the election of the 29th of April75.  
 
THE TERRITORIAL REPRESENTATION OF THE SOCIALIST VICTORY IN 1923 
Nationally, the election of the 29th of April 1923 showed the persistence of the 
traditional tyranny methods, with the prior discontinuation of mayors and councilors and the 
                                                          
70 Javier TUSELL and Juan AVILÉS: La derecha española contemporánea. Sus orígenes: el maurismo, 
Madrid, Espasa Calpe, 1986, pags 281-286. 
71 Julián BESTEIRO: “Democracia y Dictadura. El fascio, la traza y la facha”, El Socialista, 12 April, 1923.  
72 El Socialista, 30 April, 1923 and 2 May, 1923. 
73 “La candidatura republicana por Madrid, El Socialista, 14 April, 1923. 
74 “Los federales de Madrid y la candidatura republicana”, El Socialista, 20 April, 1923. 
75 El Socialista, 24 April, 1923. 
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direct proclamation of 146 parliamentarians as per article 29 of the Electoral Law of 190776. 
According to what was stated by the press, the most significant results of that general 
election were the results in Madrid, after analyzing them we can draw several interesting 
conclusions. The first one has to do with participation in the election. An isolated analysis of 
the election would confirm the general apathy referred to by the newspapers, more apparent 
in districts with higher numbers of working class people77. In those areas, the average votes 
for the city were not even met, abstentions in areas with a high representation of the 
working classes was a trait of the election.  
A long-term analysis bearing in mind all the elections held in Madrid since the 
Electoral Law of 1907 allows us to see growing discouragement amongst the population 
regarding the possibility to change the political situation with votes.  However, when 
comparing this election with the previous one, there are some nuances to that conclusion 
for working districts. The increase of participation in Hospital, Latina, Inclusa, Chamberí and 
Universidad was clearly higher than that observed in well-off districts, except for Centro, due 
to the mobilization of traders. In this sense, the socialist candidacy had a relative victory in 
awakening the interest among those social sectors that in 1920 did not choose to participate 
in the indirect intervention in the political system.  
                                                          
76 Miguel MARTÍNEZ CUADRADO, Elecciones y partidos políticos, 1868-1931, vol. II, Madrid, Taurus, 1969, 
pags 839-845. 
77 Heraldo de Madrid, La Voz, El Sol, El Imparcial and El Liberal, 30 April and 1 May 1923. 
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Figure 5. Percentages of participation in the elections in Madrid (1910-1923) 
 
Source: Archive of Villa de Madrid, Secretariat (AVM-S), electoral reports of 1910, 1914, 1916, 1918, 1919, 1920 and 1923 
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CENTRO HOSPICIO CHAMBERI CONGRESO BUENAVISTA HOSPITAL LATINA INCLUSA PALACIO UNIVERSIDAD MADRID(TOTAL)
1910 73,80% 70,84% 64,89% 69,09% 69,18% 61,70% 61,24% 63,04% 68,44% 64,02% 66,45%
1914 60,32% 58,91% 53,00% 58,22% 56,94% 47,33% 47,62% 51,39% 54,27% 51,70% 53,60%
1916 55,70% 53,96% 50,20% 55,45% 51,96% 46,54% 46,66% 52,95% 50,86% 48,87% 51,03%
1918 59,05% 58,30% 52,87% 57,97% 57,29% 48,48% 48,96% 54,54% 54,45% 51,77% 54,07%
1919 66,72% 68,35% 62,71% 63,92% 64,26% 55,46% 58,82% 60,35% 64,38% 58,28% 61,94%
1920 53,88% 54,24% 47,93% 50,74% 49,52% 43,80% 47,20% 45,20% 52,00% 45,37% 48,65%
1923 56,73% 55,58% 49,72% 52,17% 48,95% 48,26% 50,71% 50,63% 52,86% 48,80% 51,11%
1910 1914 1916 1918 1919 1920 1923
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The second conclusion comes from the analysis of the results for the socialist 
candidacy and the fact that Largo Caballero did not get a seat. The fact that Sacristán 
obtained a seat was to be expected, given the support he obtained in districts with a more 
commercial profile (Centro, Congreso and Hospicio). More difficult to understand are the 
two other seats obtained by the Ministerial to the detriment of the Socialist candidate, which 
at the time was explained by the party's press office as the lack of discipline of the workers' 
groups, who removed his name from the candidacy paper78. Despite that, the fewer votes 
received by Largo Caballero could also be explained by analyzing in detail the Republican 
results. Roberto Castrovido appears with significantly more votes than his other colleagues 
on the list, and in this sense it could be assumed that his name could have replaced that of 
Largo Caballero in a significant number of ballot papers. More so when we bear in mind the 
favorable opinions he had of Madrid's Socialism during the campaign79.  
The third main conclusion after examining the election is the clear defeat of the 
Republican party. The size of that defeat was similar to that of the election of December 
1920, in which Lerroux obtained over 8,000 votes less than the first name on the Socialist 
list. The republican factions were being penalized in the ballot boxes due to increasingly 
more timorous municipal representations, an internal organization of committees and clubs 
that had lost importance, and an organization and structure that was old-fashioned when 
compared to the Socialists. Republicanism had sunk in discredit, abandoned by the working 
masses that previously voted for it in the working class districts and unable to become a 
party that represented the middle class. To all of that, we must add the weakness shown by 
its parliamentarians in the accountability discussions in the previous mandate80.  
This last global conclusion leads us to assess the results of the monarchist 
candidacies. It seems that the separation between the Ministerial and the Maurists was 
decisive81. Adding the votes of their candidates would have led to a victory similar to that of 
1920. It is possible to observe that the recent closeness between Maura and Mussolini's 
                                                          
78 El Socialista, 30 April, 1923. 
79 “Lo que opina Castrovido”, El Socialista, 3 May, 1923. 
80 La Voz, 30 April. 1923; El Socialista, 30 April, 1923 and La Correspondencia de España, 30 April, 1923. 
81 Divisions between Maurism supporters and Ministerial in: La Acción, El Debate y ABC, 10, 29 April, 1923. 
26 
SANTIAGO DE MIGUEL SALANOVA 
Madrid, Socialist city. The keys to PSOE'S success in the 1923 general election 
 
HISPANIA NOVA, 17 (2019), págs. 1 - 48 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.20318/hn.2019.4515  
doctrines played a key role in his loss of votes, adding to that Ossorio's separation82. We 
can see in El Debate and even more so in La Acción that orthodox Maurism experimented 
in the months before the election a radicalization, proof of which were many paramilitary-like 
requests to redirect the country and establish a political system that could overcome the 
government's ineffectiveness83. Despite those arguments, the figures speak for themselves. 
Just one year earlier, the movement sang in Madrid its swan song during the holding of a 
municipal election in which they obtained ten councilor positions. In just a few months, they 
lost the social support they had obtained since 191384. 
But explaining the election results requires making a deeper analysis per 
neighborhood and electoral section in order to understand the real reasons of citizens when 
voting. Interpretation exercises on any election must go beyond establishing a mere 
dichotomy between middle class districts, favorable to Monarchy policies, and working class 
districts, keener on voting left-wing parties. After initially looking at the general results, this 
would be the first conclusion we could draw. The Socialists won comfortably in districts with 
a strong concentration of working class citizens (Chamberí, Universidad, Inclusa, Hospital 
and Latina). Monarchists-Mercantile won in a similar proportion in mainly middle to high 
class districts (Centro, Hospicio, Congreso and Palacio). Finally, we have the district of 
Buenavista, whose aristocratic condition traditionally justified its support for Maurism.  
                                                          
82 Javier TUSELL and Juan AVILÉS: La derecha española contemporánea… op. cit., pags 257-294, María 
Jesús GONZÁLEZ: Ciudadanía y acción. El conservadurismo maurista, 1907-1923, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1998; 
Antonio M. LÓPEZ: Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo. Biografía política de un conservador heterodoxo, Madrid, Ed. 
Reus, 2017. 
83 El Debate, 1 April, 1923 and La Acción, 28 and 30 April, 1923. 
84 Santiago DE MIGUEL: “La eclosión del maurismo en una ciudad en proceso de bipolarización política. 
Madrid, 1913-1917”, Aportes. Revista de Historia Contemporánea, vol. 32, nº 93, 2017, pags 65-103. 
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Table 2. Results of the April 1923 election in Madrid 
 
Footnotes (M-M): Monarchist-Mercantile; (PSOE): Socialist; (MAU): Maurist; (REP): Republican and (PC): Communist. Source: 
AVM-S, call numbers 22-251-1 to 22-254-2
Candidatos CENTRO HOSPICIO CHAMBERI BUENAVISTA CONGRESO HOSPITAL LATINA INCLUSA PALACIO UNIVERSIDAD TOTAL
Julián Besteiro (PSOE) 1.026 1.485 2.848 1.696 1.658 2.920 2.946 2.606 1.492 2.860 21.537
Pablo Iglesias (PSOE) 1.018 1.502 2.858 1.653 1.608 2.921 2.918 2.590 1.473 2.863 21.404
Manuel Cordero (PSOE) 994 1.436 2.782 1.637 1.592 2.918 2.924 2.652 1.463 2.768 21.166
Antonio Sacristán (M-M) 2.546 2.280 1.931 2.180 2.558 1.645 1.894 1.578 2.248 1.789 20.649
Fernando de los Ríos (PSOE) 899 1.306 2.652 1.574 1.480 2.778 2.738 2.503 1.322 2.682 19.934
Andrés Saborit (PSOE) 880 1.290 2.596 1.535 1.400 2.776 2.764 2.487 1.345 2.657 19.730
Francisco García Molinas (M-M) 1.972 2.079 1.920 2.112 2.238 1.591 1.703 1.428 2.361 1.759 19.163
Francisco Álvarez Rodriguez Villamil (M-M) 2.029 1.919 1.848 1.889 2.295 1.603 1.880 1.482 2.250 1.796 18.991
Francisco Largo Caballero (PSOE) 793 1.184 2.510 1.460 1.330 2.677 2.616 2.406 1.259 2.511 18.746
Luis Garrido Juaristi (M-M) 1.879 1.987 1.892 1.927 2.266 1.561 1.785 1.468 2.221 1.738 18.724
José Álvarez Arranz (M-M) 1.928 1.935 1.762 1.959 2.252 1.489 1.715 1.401 2.310 1.663 18.414
Emilio Blanco Parrondo (M-M) 1.802 1.759 1.662 1.717 2.043 1.517 1.859 1.440 2.235 1.724 17.758
Alfredo Serrano Jover (MAU) 1.389 1.608 1.462 2.480 1.684 1.165 1.281 1.053 1.753 1.377 15.252
Antonio Goicoechea (MAU) 1.298 1.626 1.534 2.468 1.640 1.151 1.262 1.070 1.629 1.276 14.954
Luis López Doriga (MAU) 1.178 1.437 1.361 2.405 1.535 1.186 1.199 1.020 1.486 1.199 14.006
Ramón del Rivero (MAU) 1.155 1.429 1.343 2.383 1.476 1.043 1.152 999 1.461 1.217 13.658
Miguel Colom (MAU) 1.040 1.368 1.311 2.223 1.421 1.023 1.115 997 1.414 1.126 13.038
Antonio Conrado (MAU) 1.072 1.307 1.277 2.285 1.416 1.027 1.093 962 1.426 1.069 12.934
Roberto Castrovido (REP) 1.118 1.404 1.331 1.030 1.273 1.191 1.549 937 798 1.159 11.790
Emilio Menéndez Pallarés (REP) 900 1.015 1.090 887 1.045 1.035 1.332 821 627 942 9.694
Rafael Salillas (REP) 704 825 934 763 865 928 1.256 740 529 819 8.363
Gabriel Montero (REP) 756 805 888 701 864 933 1.202 731 511 736 8.127
Adolfo Álvarez Buylla (REP) 678 800 900 716 859 878 1.211 696 512 773 8.023
Antonio Jaén (REP) 618 697 795 614 758 818 1.179 668 442 663 7.252
José María Viñuelas (PC) 123 115 353 182 121 311 449 363 112 352 2.481
Óscar Pérez Solís (PC) 87 69 216 122 91 223 253 236 81 242 1.620
Manuel Núñez Arenas (PC) 76 60 203 124 76 221 256 235 72 236 1.559
Ramón Lamoneda (PC) 68 60 207 117 62 201 219 221 72 233 1.460
Antonio García Quejido (PC) 63 43 183 107 58 180 221 204 63 216 1.338
Isidoro Rodríguez (PC) 59 46 180 106 59 182 221 216 59 208 1.336
Votos en blanco 154 247 278 189 231 194 191 20 167 194 1.865
Votos emitidos 5.928 6.579 7.967 7.620 7.200 7.321 8.258 6.617 6.687 7.617 71.794
1 
Figure 6. Voting trends in Madrid per municipal district in 1923 
 
Source: AVM-S, 22-251-1 to 22-254-2 
 
Figure 7. Classification of the election sections for the districts of Madrid according 
to political orientation in the 29th of April 1923 election.  
 
Source: AVM-S, 22-251-1 to 22-254-2 
4 
29 
11 6 
28 22 24 
3 
29 23 20 
4 
6 21 
3 
6 8 
20 
2 
1 15 
2 
1 
3 
2 
1 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
nÚ
M
ER
O 
DE
 SE
CC
IO
NE
S 
DISTRITOS 
Socialistas Monárquicas Mauristas Republicanas
29 
SANTIAGO DE MIGUEL SALANOVA 
Madrid, Socialist city. The keys to PSOE'S success in the 1923 general election 
 
HISPANIA NOVA, 17 (2019), págs. 1 - 48 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.20318/hn.2019.4515  
An analysis per electoral section in each district allows us to fine-tune the 
interpretation of the results. Sacristán was very relevant in Centro district, an area 
characterized by a large convergence of traders85. His higher vote percentages came from 
sections that typically have a higher concentration of workers from the traditional services 
sector. Those were the cases of section 9, which included the main financial areas of 
Madrid and that of services, between Puerta del Sol and the convergence of Sevilla street 
with Plaza de Canalejas; section 13, defined as the area with the largest amount of more 
modest commercial and industrial premises (Plaza Mayor and surrounding area); and 
section 17, mainly calle del Arenal and streets close by, with higher social and economic 
profiles than the previous ones.  
The biggest percentages of Socialist vote only reached 25%, and they were 
especially in sections where there was a greater degree of abstentions, such as sections 2 
and 3. The former included secondary and smaller streets in the southern borders of the 
district, close to calle de San Bernardo. The latter includes perpendicular roads to the 
spectacular Gran Via, with a social landscape similar to that of the 21st century. They were 
areas where Socialism could form a more robust political clientele, mainly among day 
labourers, qualified manual workers and poorly paid services sector employees. Despite all 
that, Castrovido obtained more votes than Besteiro, showing that, even during their acute 
crisis, Republicanism still obtained better results than Socialism in areas characterized by a 
greater presence of trade bourgeoisie.  
  
                                                          
85 Santiago DE MIGUEL: Madrid, sinfonía de una metrópoli europea, 1860-1936, Madrid, Catarata, 2016. 
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Table 3. Social and professional profiles of those who voted and abstained in section 
3 of Centro (calle de Silva, calle de Tudescos and callejón de Tudescos) 
Social and professional category No. % Votes Abstentions 
Liberal professionals and technicians 36 7.29% 18 18 
Administrative and management 
workers 2 0.40% 0 2 
Office workers and civil servants 83 16.80% 46 37 
Sales people 75 15.18% 40 35 
Service sector workers  57 11.54% 25 32 
Farmers and forestry sector workers 5 1.01% 0 5 
Production and transport workers 210 42.51% 100 110 
No profession mentioned 26 5.26% 14 12 
Total 494 100% 243 251 
Day labourers and non-qualified 
workers 125 25.30% 58 67 
Source: AVM-S, 22-254-2. 
 
In Hospicio, the victory was also for the monarchist-mercantile candidacy, although 
less clearly than in the previous case due to slight increases in republican, socialist and 
maurist votes. The largest amount of ministerial votes only reached close to 50% in sections 
7, 9 and 11. The first one stood out for including a large sector of middle class traders, given 
that it included a large section of Calle de Hortaleza. The second one included a good 
section of Calle de Alcalá (the one devoted mainly to banks, with representatives from the 
sector among its residents) and a good part of the first section of Gran Vía (Avenida del 
Conde de Peñalver) and nearby streets with mid to high rental prices. The third area was 
the street continuation of Gran Via towards Calle de Barquillo and surrounding area, with 
similar social profiles among its voters. Only five sections of the district escaped from the 
monarchist control. Sections 2, 17, 18. 20 and 24 include secondary and smaller streets 
from the north of the city centre. They were the main source of socialist votes, which in the 
best of cases received over 30% of the votes. They were urban spaces similar to the leftish 
ones in Centro, although with less specialized commercial activity.  
 
 
 
 
31 
SANTIAGO DE MIGUEL SALANOVA 
Madrid, Socialist city. The keys to PSOE'S success in the 1923 general election 
 
HISPANIA NOVA, 17 (2019), págs. 1 - 48 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.20318/hn.2019.4515  
Table 4. Social and professional profiles of those who voted and abstained in 
section 24 of Hospicio (calle del Barco 14 to 34, calle del Escorial and calle de Santa 
Bárbara) 
Social and professional category No. % Votes Abstentions 
Liberal professionals and technicians 35 9.19% 19 16 
Administrative and management 
workers 0 0% 0 0 
Office workers and civil servants 59 15.49% 34 25 
Sales people 42 11.02% 24 18 
Service sector workers  36 9.45% 19 17 
Farmers and forestry sector workers 0 0% 0 0 
Production and transport workers 199 52.23% 104 95 
No profession mentioned 10 2.62% 3 7 
Total 381 100% 203 178 
Day labourers and non-qualified 
workers 153 40.16% 79 74 
Source: AVM-S, 22-254-2. 
 
The third district with very similar results in terms of social support to the candidacies 
was that of Congreso. Most of its neighborhoods were in the old city, in an area where 
dynastic parties and their old-standing loyal clientele were guaranteed, but it grew 
exponentially in the area of Ensanche and, above all, in Extrarradio. The neighborhoods of 
Gutenberg and Plaza de Toros contained the sections that were more prone to a left-wing 
vote.  
Gutenberg had become an area with a large working class, linked to the railway and 
with a significant presence of warehouses and factories. In 1923, many modest traders and 
low-qualification employees who worked for the services sector also lived there. In turn, 
Plaza de Toros was an area that did not portray the typical ambience of a city in the process 
of modernization due to the huge amount of tile factories, shacks and non-paved streets, 
attractive for modest families86. From the former neighborhood came the best results for the 
socialist candidacy. It obtained over 40% of the votes in sections that included some of the 
most disadvantaged streets, with lower rental prices, mid-way between Pacífico and the 
outskirts of Puente de Vallecas (sections 6, 19 and 20). In Plaza de Toros sections they 
obtained votes close to 40%, although they were overtaken by votes for the Monarchist-
                                                          
86 Borja CARBALLO, El Ensanche Este. Salamanca-Retiro 1860-1931. El Madrid burgués, Madrid, Catarata, 
2015. 
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Mercantile. The scenario observed when looking at the votes cast in this area were better 
than those of the wealthiest areas of the city center, where the candidacy did not obtain over 
15% of the votes (especially in areas that had been highlighted as being the main keeps of 
Maurism in previous years, such as the areas close to Puerta de Alcalá and Floridablanca, 
around the parliament). 
 
Table 5. Social and professional profiles of those who voted and abstained in section 
19 of Congreso (calles Arregui and Arrej, Francisco Abril, Los Mesejo, Luis Mitjans, 
Pacífico (31 till the end), Porvenir, Puente de Vallecas, Iriguet and Tejares de 
Asmesto, La Basilisa and Valeria) 
Social and professional category No. % Votes Abstentions 
Liberal professionals and 
technicians 20 4.05% 6 14 
Administrative and management 
workers 1 0.20% 1 0 
Office workers and civil servants 35 7.09% 19 16 
Sales people 28 5.67% 16 12 
Service sector workers 43 8.70% 28 15 
Farmers and forestry sector 
workers 0 0% 0 0 
Production and transport workers 343 69.43% 157 186 
No profession mentioned 24 4.86% 10 14 
Total 494 100% 237 257 
Day laborers and non-qualified 
workers 266 53.85% 125 141 
Source: AVM-S, 22-254-2. 
The district of Palacio in principle presented a similar scenario to the three areas 
mentioned before. However, contrary to what happened in Centro, Hospicio and Congreso, 
where we can observe the great influence of the propaganda done by Sacristán, receiving 
the support of the members of his class, in Palacio the loyal vote remained indelible. 
Sacristán was not the most voted candidate in the list, rather the Romanonist Francisco 
García Molinas.  
Palacio was a district whose sector that belonged to the city center was characterized 
for having many residents who were state, municipal and monarchy employees. It is not 
surprising that the sections including some of the main areas of the neighborhoods of 
Senado, Isabel II and Carlos III (located between Plaza de España, Palacio Real and the 
areas around Plaza de la Ópera and calle del Arenal) reflected higher percentages of votes 
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for the Monarchist-Mercantile candidacy. Those spaces were precisely the ones that 
showed higher participation rates in the whole city (close to 60%), which showed the 
perseverance of official influence.  
The areas of Palacio where Socialism had greater support were mainly of two types. 
On the one hand, the Socialists had more votes in sections of the city center that included 
small streets with a strong presence of day laborers and manual worker families with some 
qualification (back of the Senate with buildings characterized for presenting some of the 
lowest rental prices in the area and streets that led to Calle de San Bernardo around Plaza 
de los Mostenses, very working class areas). On the other hand, the higher percentages of 
votes came from sections 21 (44.23%) and 22 (37.77%), belonging to Extra radio in the 
area of Casa de Campo.  
 
Table 6. Social and profesional profiles of those who voted and abstained in section 
21 of Palacio (Casa de Campo, Comandante Fortea, Marqués del Monistrol, Plaza del 
Puente Segovia, Pradera del Corregidor, Fuente de la Teja, Paseo Virgen del Puerto 
and Porvenir) 
Social and professional category No. % Votes Abstentions 
Liberal professionals and 
technicians 10 2.02% 2 8 
Administrative and management 
workers 0 0% 0 0 
Office workers and civil servants 37 7.47% 18 19 
Sales people 30 6.06% 16 14 
Service sector workers  17 3.43% 10 7 
Farmers and forestry sector workers 0 0% 0 0 
Production and transport workers 385 77.78% 150 235 
No profession mentioned 18 3.64% 8 10 
Total 495 100% 204 293 
Day labourers and non-qualified 
workers 344 69.49% 131 213 
Source: AVM-S, 22-254-2. 
 
Section 21 was one of the few that recorded incidents during the voting session, due 
to the breaking of a ballot box by a Republican inspector as a sign of protest given the 
actions of the chairman of the polling station who fraudulently introduced votes in the ballot 
34 
SANTIAGO DE MIGUEL SALANOVA 
Madrid, Socialist city. The keys to PSOE'S success in the 1923 general election 
 
HISPANIA NOVA, 17 (2019), págs. 1 - 48 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.20318/hn.2019.4515  
boxes87. The results were, to say the least, confusing. In a space taken over by day 
laborers, mixed with a handful of low-qualification manual workers (builder assistants, 
carpenters, locksmiths, mechanics and bookbinders), the vote variations amongst 
monarchist candidates were high. Whilst Francisco Álvarez Rodríguez Villamil received 103 
votes, Sacristán and Garrido Juaristi only surpassed a dozen each. Moreover, this was one 
of the few sections in Madrid where there was uniformity of votes amongst members of the 
Socialist list. There were only two votes difference between Cordero (94) and Largo 
Caballero (92). The same scenario was seen in section 22, which included many streets 
with working class residents such as Paseo de Extremadura and Puerta del Ángel, which 
means the Socialist vote division did not take place there.  
It is possible that Buenavista was the most peculiar district of those analyzed here, as 
it was the only constituency where the maurist candidacy won. This result was due to the 
intense activity the movement carried out in the area since its creation, with the 
convergence of their social bases and of some internal bodies (committees, circles, workers' 
training centers). This meant that there was a clear political trend of modern conservatism in 
the sections capitalized by the social elites. Here we could find neighborhoods such as 
Fernando el Santo, which included some of the most expensive and luxurious streets in 
Madrid at that time (Fortuny, Monte Esquinza, Zurbarán, Zurbano, the initial part of Paseo 
de la Castellana and part of calle de Almagro). All of them joined in section 5, where the 
Maurists obtained 47.37% of the votes cast. Those who appeared in the lists of that area 
were mainly highly specialized liberal professionals, such as engineers, architects, lawyers, 
magistrates and diplomats. 
The trends of the maurist vote were also present in other wealthy areas such as 
Ensanche Este (Biblioteca, Marqués de Salamanca, Conde de Aranda and Monasterio), but 
they totally disappeared in the sections of the Extra radio’s (Guindalera, Prosperidad and 
Las Mercedes). The percentages of Socialist votes swung between 35% and 50% in areas 
where the ASM had carried out very intense propaganda during the campaign, by recruiting 
inspectors and holding rallies and conferences. Section 25 may represent the paradigmatic 
example of the support that the Socialists could obtain in that district, which included most 
streets contained within the borders of Príncipe de Vergara, Avenida de América, López de 
                                                          
87 La Correspondencia de España, La Voz, Heraldo de Madrid, 30 April and 1 May, 1923. 
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Hoyos and Canillas. Socialism's political clientele in this area, where it obtained 48.12% of 
the votes (with high participation, showing a large degree of social mobilization), was made 
up by masses of day laborers together with manual workers from different industries 
(typographers, bookbinders, tram drivers, carpenters, painters, electricians, lathe operators 
and tailors).  
Contrary to the five districts before, Chamberí and Universidad, in the north of the city 
center and Ensanche, and Latina, Hospital and Inclusa, in the south, gave a firm support to 
the Socialist candidacy. In the first case, they obtained the majority in 29 of the 33 sections. 
That was the case even in city center neighborhoods such as Monteleón and Dos de Mayo, 
where the Dynastic parties used to have their clientele more secured. Compared to other 
districts, it was Iglesias, not Besteiros, who achieved the largest number of votes, giving us 
an idea of the support the party had in those areas, despite the fact that the socialist leader 
had been distanced from the propaganda throughout the campaign88.  
Moving towards the north of this district was synonymous of an important increase in 
the percentages of Socialist votes, although Cuatro Caminos was where the highest support 
was found. From the beginning of the 20th century, this zone represented the main socialist 
bastion in Madrid. Starting from zero in terms of election history, the Socialists started 
sinking in in the political culture of its inhabitants, championing their interests from the city 
council, mobilizing people in times of social protests and establishing a constant 
communication about their manifestos in rallies and conferences. There we could also find 
the offices of the Cooperativa Socialista Madrileña (Madrid's Socialist Cooperative) and of 
the Círculo Socialista del Norte (Socialist circle of the North), which, at times of election, 
became the main hubs of the district commission, in charge of collecting questions and 
queries from fellow socialists and supporters. Sections 23, 25, 27 and 29 belonged to that 
neighborhood and were considered to be loyal territories for the Socialist, with voting 
percentages higher than 50%. Moreover, they were areas where the party carried out an 
intense service amongst their members to avoid vote buying89 
 
                                                          
88 Rubén PALLOL: El Madrid moderno: Chamberí (el Ensanche Norte), símbolo del nacimiento de una nueva 
capital, 1860-1931, Madrid, Tesis Doctoral, UCM, 2009. 
89 La Correspondencia de España, 30 April, 1923. 
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Table 7. Social and professional profiles of those who vote and abstained in section 
27 of Chamberí (calles de Bravo Murillo 22 to 48, Felipe el Hermoso, García de 
Paredes 1 to 15 and 2 to 24, Marqués de la Romana, Medellín, Santísima Trinidad and 
Zarzal) 
Social and professional category No. % Votes Abstentions 
Liberal professionals and technicians 18 3.69% 5 13 
Administrative and management 
workers 2 0.41% 1 1 
Office workers and civil servants 49 10.04% 33 16 
Sales people 29 5.94% 16 13 
Service sector workers  39 7.99% 24 15 
Farmers and forestry sector workers 1 0.20% 0 1 
Production and transport workers 322 65.98% 152 170 
No profession mentioned 28 5.74% 11 17 
Total 488 100% 242 246 
Day labourers and non-qualified 
workers 227 46.52% 102 125 
Source: AVM-S, 22-254-2. 
 
Universidad was another district where there was a clear Socialist enthusiasm. Only 
three sections - 8, 12 and 31 - gave a greater number of votes for the Monarchist-Mercantile 
candidacy. They were sectors from the city center where, despite the fact that Socialism 
advanced gradually in terms of social support, did not manage to fully break down the 
clientele networks of dynastic parties (around streets such as Pez, San Bernardo, Princesa 
and Alberto Aguilera). Just like in Chamberí, moving from those neighborhoods from the city 
center to Extra radio, past areas in Ensanche Norte, raised the percentage of votes above 
50%. Bellas Vistas was the main bag of votes for the candidacy. A zone where the party's 
militants had gradually been growing for 15 years, because it was a key location for the 
holding of rallies and election conferences, or simply for information conferences and due to 
the improvement initiatives that Socialist councilors in the previous periods made (opening 
up of schools, closing of non-hygienic clandestine slaughterhouses, listening to the 
demands to reduce tram prices). Section 25 was the best example of the social rooting of 
the party, reaching 57.06% of the votes cast.  
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Table 8. Social and economic profiles of those who voted and abstained in section  
25 of Universidad (calles de Adrián Pulido, Alejandro Rodríguez, Castilla, Francisco 
Salas, Juan Pradillo, María Pedraza, Manuel Pradillo, Marianela, Ondrid, Proletarios, 
Rafael Herreros and Wad Ras) 
Social and professional 
category No. % Votes Abstentions 
Liberal professionals and 
technicians 3 0.69% 0 3 
Administrative and management 
workers 0 0% 0 0 
Office workers and civil servants 21 4.86% 11 10 
Sales people 16 3.70% 12 4 
Service sector workers  17 3.94% 7 10 
Farmers and forestry sector 
workers 0 0% 0 0 
Production and transport 
workers 363 84.03% 135 228 
No profession mentioned 12 2.78% 4 8 
Total 432 100% 169 263 
Day labourers and non-qualified 
workers 298 68.98% 104 194 
Source: AVM-S, 22-254-2. 
Separate mention must be given to the results of Hospital, Inclusa and Latina. The 
move from Republicanism to Socialism in those areas started happening some time before 
due to the unity crisis suffered by the former and the initiatives of the latter in terms of 
neighborhood improvement, including the creation of the Círculo Socialista del Sur (Socialist 
Circle of the South) as a body that advanced in the process of political socialization. They 
clearly overtook the Republicans in the municipal and general elections held in February 
and December of 1920 respectively. In the latter ones, they doubled the amount of 
republican votes in Hospital and Latina and trebled them in Inclusa. Two and a half years 
later, the distances grew larger. Even the Maurists overtook the Republicans, despite having 
renounced years earlier to obtaining votes from there after several unsuccessful attempts to 
generate social bases there.   
In Inclusa, the socialist victory came in the hands of Cordero in the campaign. His 
success can only be explained from an urban perspective and because of the activities he 
developed as deputy mayor of the districts during the previous years. His constant 
inspection campaign to avoid food fraud and the demands he made to fix the terrible 
hygiene-sanitary conditions of those streets gained him greater social support. 
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Nevertheless, the district presented important nuances among its sections. The areas 
bordering Centro (neighborhoods of Duque de Alba and, to a lesser extent, Amazonas) 
showed clear similarities in the voting trends with the areas that were more devoted to 
traditional commercial activities of the first one (neighbourhoods Constitución and Correos).  
In turn, the Socialists obtained the full control of the voters in the southern areas of 
the city center and Ensanche. In the first ones, the masses of day laborers and the few 
qualified craftsmen residing in working class neighborhoods such as Rastro, Cabestreros, 
Huerta del Bayo and the southern part of Amazonas voted for Cordero with the same 
intensity than twenty years before when they voted for the Republican Union in the district 
(especially the final sector of Calle del Amparo starting from Plaza de Lavapiés and 
surrounding areas, areas where they reported vote buying attempts from Ciervists candidate 
Alvarez Arranz). In the sections of Gasómetro and Peñuelas, in Ensanche, the situation was 
similar. More than five out of every ten voters who voted did so for the Socialists (Paseo de 
las Acacias, Ronda de Toledo, Peñuelas and Paseo de los Olmos, amongst other areas). 
The only sections where there were confusing results were those located in Extra radio 
(neighborhood of Marqués de Comillas). Despite the clear presence of day laborers, it was 
one of the areas where the monarchist-mercantile candidacy obtained greater social 
support. Bearing in mind the precedents of vote adulteration in previous elections, we could 
not rule out the use of influence and vote buying by the dynastic forces in an area clearly 
removed from the socialist trend of the periphery. 
Table 9. Social and economic profiles of those who voted and abstained for Section 17 of the 
district of Inclusa (calles de Amparo no. 54 to 92) and Sombrerete (no. 7 y no.8 till the end of 
the street) 
Social and professional category No. % Votes Abstentions 
Liberal professionals and technicians 10 2.30% 7 3 
Administrative and management 
workers 0 0% 0 0 
Office workers and civil servants 35 8.05% 18 17 
Sales people 13 2.99% 8 5 
Service sector workers  12 2.76% 8 4 
Farmers and forestry sector workers 0 0% 0 0 
Production and transport workers 344 79.08% 173 171 
No profession mentioned 21 4.83% 8 13 
Total 435 100% 222 213 
Day labourers and non-qualified 
workers 248 57.01% 123 125 
Source: AVM-S, 22-254-2. 
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Due to the social and economic profiles of those neighborhoods and the propaganda 
activity and social mobilization strategies developed by the Socialists there, Hospital was a 
district that provided similar results to those of Inclusa, with the exception of Cordero's 
leadership due to the local influence, now replaced by Iglesias and Besteiro in the first 
positions. The socialist vote percentage generally was practically identical to that area 
(39.90%) although the victory was more complete (28 sections over a total of 31). The areas 
that were closer to the city of Centro and Congreso, with a greater proportion of members 
from the traditional commercial sector (section 1, 3 and 5 between the neighborhoods of 
Jesús y María, Ministriles and Torrecilla), provided good results for a monarchist-mercantile 
candidacy which had no option of victory in the district, as it was stated in the press90. 
Table 10. Social and professional profiles of those who voted and abstained in 
Section 26 of Hospital (calles de Bustamante, General Lacy numbers 2 to 10, Juan De 
Mariana, Méndez Álvaro odd numbers and 10 till the end of the street, Ramírez del 
Prado and Camino and Paseo de Yeseros) 
Social and professional 
category No. % Votes Abstentions 
Liberal professionals and 
technicians 3 0.63% 1 2 
Administrative and management 
workers 1 0.21% 0 1 
Office workers and civil servants 19 3.98% 11 8 
Sales people 16 3.35% 10 6 
Service sector workers  9 1.89% 5 4 
Farmers and forestry sector 
workers 0 0% 0 0 
Production and transport workers 422 88.47% 181 241 
No profession mentioned 7 1.47% 6 1 
Total 477 100% 214 263 
Day labourers and non-qualified 
workers 372 77.99% 153 219 
Source: AVM-S, 22-254-2. 
Despite the lack of possibilities of dynastic success, Hospital recorded a significant 
number of incidents during the election. There were attempts of duplicated votes, casting of 
votes with fake names or with names of deceased people and, above all, bribery and vote 
buying, especially in the taverns of the southern neighborhoods of the center, subjected to 
                                                          
90 La Correspondencia de España, 30 April, 1923. 
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intense inspection by the Socialists and Republicans91. After dismantling those 
wrongdoings, the Socialists had no problems winning in sections of neighborhoods such as 
Lavapiés, Argumosa, Doctor Fourquet and Primavera, although in the areas of  Ensanche 
Sur they obtained their highest percentages. Those were the neighborhoods of Pacifico, the 
hub of Atocha's station, inhabited to a large extent by workers of the railway sector, and 
those of Delicias and Santa Maria de la Cabeza, still immersed in a process of revaluation 
of their properties and characterized by a huge convergence of immigrant families headed 
by day laborers and craftsmen on the verge of poverty92. In Section 26, near the station of 
Delicias, the Socialists reached nearly 60% of support amongst voters known for rarely 
stating their professional specialization, as well as railway workers, locksmiths, mechanics 
and carpenters.  
To conclude, Latina was a district where the socialist candidacy also obtained an 
important victory, although not as conclusive as in Inclusa or Hospital. This difference was 
due to an increase in the number of votes for the Republican candidacy. Although 
Republicanism had totally lost its hegemony in this area, it still had some support in the 
working class of Humilladero and Cava, and in some sections of Calatrava and Aguas, 
defined by a high concentration of day laborers and low-specialization craftsmen who lived 
in cheap and overcrowded homes93. In those areas, the percentages of votes for Castrovido 
could reach 23-30%, something that did not happen in other districts. In general, peaks in 
the trend of monarchist-mercantile votes and falls in the percentages of maurist, and above 
all, socialist votes accompanied the election behavior of the residents of those sections. 
Therefore, they could be seen as areas with a more old-fashioned urban political culture 
compared to others that had seen greater modernization over the last decade.  
The support to the monarchist-mercantile candidacy increased in sections closer to 
the city center (Cava and Ayuntamiento), where the social profile was more heterogeneous, 
due to a larger presence of traders and employees mainly linked to the public administration 
of the municipality.  In those areas the percentage of votes reached close to or even higher 
than 30% of the votes, whereas in the neighborhoods located more to the south there were 
                                                          
91 El Liberal, El Imparcial, El Socialista, La Voz y Heraldo de Madrid, 30 April and 1 May, 1923. 
92 Fernando VICENTE: El Ensanche Sur. Arganzuela 1860-1931. Los barrios negros, Madrid, Catarata, 2015. 
93 Luis DÍAZ: Los barrios bajos de Madrid, 1880-1931, Madrid, Catarata, 2016. 
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drastic falls. Socialism was the prevailing political force in the more disadvantaged areas of 
Calatrava, in all the sections that were part of San Francisco and Arganzuela and in the 
spaces of the Southern Extra radio (Imperial and San Isidro). A paradigmatic example of the 
socialist strength in the district was section 24, which included the area of Cambroneras, 
Paseo de los Melancólicos and Paseo Imperial in the deteriorated neighborhood that gave 
its name to the third street. Besteiro received nearly two thirds of the support in an area 
inhabited by day laborers and other construction and railway workers.  
Table 11. Social and professional profiles of voters and those who abstained in 
section 24 of La Latina (calle and callejón de Cambroneras, calle de Gil Imón, Paseo 
Imperial and paseo de los Melancólicos) 
Social and professional category No. % Votes Abstentions 
Liberal professionals and technicians 1 0.20% 1 0 
Administrative and management 
workers 0 0% 0 0 
Office workers and civil servants 12 2.42% 5 7 
Sales people 22 4.44% 10 12 
Service sector workers  10 2.02% 5 5 
Farmers and forestry sector workers 3 0.61% 0 3 
Production and transport workers 441 89.09% 161 280 
No profession mentioned 6 1.21% 3 3 
Total 495 100% 185 310 
Day laborers and non-qualified 
workers 397 80.20% 143 254 
Source: AVM-S, 22-254-2. 
 
In 1923, Madrid continued to be a city with bipolar votes, with a city center that 
remained loyal to old political cultures and an area of Ensanche and Extrarradio that run 
free of monarchist control in most of its areas, except certain areas in the north and east of 
the city where Maurism had managed to create solid social bases during the previous 
decade. However, the differences amongst the different areas had gradually grown smaller, 
a trend that would be finally consolidated in the following election in which Madrilenians 
voted: the municipal election of the 12th of April 1931.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
A detailed analysis of a general election is an exercise that allows us to observe 
signs of modernization in an urban area such as Madrid at the end of the Restoration 
period. This city portrayed at the time movements in the socialization of politics and the 
election behaviors that were different to those that existed at the beginning of the 20th 
century. The huge size increase of the capital was simultaneous to the development of a 
political culture with new heights, which must be analyzed separate from generalist 
discourses, from the doctrine evolution of parties or their influence in the political regime of 
that era. Examining the case of Agrupación Socialista Madrileña in this context has helped 
to verify some of those transformations, focusing on the machinery behind the internal 
structure of the party, the close contact with its social bases that led to several strategies 
and understanding the election results from an urban perspective. 
Based on those premises, the socialist victory can be explained by the impact of 
several variables. We must reflect on those related to the national context, which would 
entail focusing on the political and social conflict atmosphere and on the questioning of the 
power's resources after the conflict in Morocco. However, in this paper we focus more on 
other factors, specifically linked to the local realm, starting with the weakness shown by 
Madrid's Republicanism after the break-up of Alianza de Izquierdas (Left Alliance) in 1919, 
followed by the lack of understanding between the monarchist parties and the maurist 
conservatism which prevented their coalition, and ending with the consequences of the 
authoritarian drift of the latter of those since the middle of 1922.  
In the midst of those tensions, PSOE emerged as the party that better adapted to the 
new era. It had already played an important role in the past by enlarging the political culture 
of Madrid's inhabitants. By analyzing its election campaign, we can clearly see how the 
organization’s tasks were fine-tuned ahead of the election day with its bases, either by 
correcting the lists of election rolls to guarantee true suffrage, by creating an intermediate 
network of political figures that could help with that task (supporters, proxies and 
inspectors), or by following innovative guidelines in their collective propaganda strategies. 
The hosting of general rallies and neighborhood rallies also helped to win the individual 
conquest of new consciences, namely in those areas of Ensanche and Extra radio where 
the clientele networks of old political parties was little or no configured at all.  
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Finally, one of the key objectives of this endeavor has been to establish a correlation 
between the general lines of municipal action within the PSOE and the social support 
obtained during the election. In general, it has been a historiographical trend to leave on the 
sidelines the behaviors demonstrated by the parties' representatives in the city council, 
based on the idea that they were purely administrative entities created by the desire of 
those above them. For exactly the same reasons, the municipal elections that led to the 
formation of those institutions has not been sufficiently studied, despite the fact that in them 
we could discern greater competition between political forces and their support for the 
design of updated plans or programs focused on social and economic changes that were 
taking place in the urban arena.  
Those issues are fundamental when starting an election analysis that, at an urban 
level, cannot simply be explained by the differences between wealthy municipal districts, 
more prone to a dynastic vote, and mainly working class districts, more prone to a left-wing 
vote. Although this interpretation is valid in general terms, it must be transcended by a more 
accurate analysis, brought down to the level of neighborhood and electoral section. This 
effort allows us to establish a more accurate relationship between the political sign of the 
different areas of Madrid and the support the parties had there, due to the creation of 
committees and election office centers or meeting spaces prone to political indoctrination of 
its residents or to the predominance of different urban areas in the municipal programs.   
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